When I was young and free and used to wear silksl (and sat in the front pew, left of center, I might add), I used to think that my childhood minister occasionally made the oddest announcement. Whenever any one of our three church choirs was invited to perform at another congregation, our minister, suspecting that several of his members would stay home or do something else that afternoon, having already spent some hours at worship, skillfully anticipated them. Those who were not going with the choir were importuned to "send go." The injunction always tickled me, as I took considerable pleasure in conjuring up the image of a snaggletoothed replica of my seven-year-old self going off in my place. But the minister meant "send money," so pass the collection plate. Decades later, I decided that the "send-go" of my childhood had an equivalent in the semiotic/philosophical discourse as the mark of substitution, the translated inflections of selves beyond the threshold of the fleshed, natural girl. It was not only a delightful but a useful idea to me that one herself This essay is an excerpt from a longer work to be published under the same title in, first, Boundae 2 23 (Fall 1996) and, second, Female Subjects in Black and White: Race, Psychoanalysis, Feminism, ed. Elizabeth Abel, Barbara Christian, and Helene Moglen (forthcoming from University of California Press). Many thanks to Elizabeth Abel. Unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own.
words" as they lead us out to the re-presentational where the subject commences its journey in the looking glass of the symbolic. Thus, to represent a self through masks of self-negation is to take on the work of discovering where one "is at" the subject led back to his signifying dependence. Freud had thought a different idea bringing unconsciousness under the domination of the preconscious while Lacan, Freud's post-Saussurean poet, revised the idea as the "mapped" "network of signifiers" brought into existence at the place where the subject was, has always been: "'Wo es war, soll Ich werden."'4 We could speak of this process as the subject making its mark through the transitivity of reobjectivations, the silent traces of desire on which the object of the subject hinges. This movement across an interior space demarcates the discipline of self-reflection, or the content of a self-interrogation that "race" always covers over as an already-answered. But for oneself another question is posed: What might I become, insofar as . . . ? To the extent that "I" "signs" itself"elsewhere," represents itselfbeyond the given, the onus of becoming boomerangs 5 Ralph Ellison's word as it rebounds on the one putting the question. But what impedes the function of the question?
Once posed, the interrogative gesture, the interior intersubjectivity, would fill up the Fanonian abzme, "the great white error ... the great black mirage."6 But might we suggest that a different question could come about with the acquisition of a supplemental literacy, one that could be regarded as alien and for that very reason to be learned and pressed into service? Frantz Fanon assumed that his great positivities (conceptual narratives) were always and constantly equal to themselves, and he was exactly right. But he went further by saying that both of them were "not" in the sense that they were borne on the wings of an illusion and to the extent that they were both unsatisfactory as self-sufficient points of the stationary, and this seems right too. He did not, however, ask of himself and his formulation, So what? Such a question could not have been posed by him because his allegory had not only responded to the "so what?" but had preempted indeed any other impudent intervention. But if we move back in the direction of a "prior" moment, the seven-year-old in the front pew, for instance, we can then go forward with another set of competencies that originate, we might say, in the bone ignorance of curiosity, the child's gift for strange dreams of flying and bizarre, yet correct, notions about the adult bodies around her how, for example, her father and brothers bent forward in a grimace when mischievously struck in a certain place above the knees by a little girl, propelling herself off a rollaway 
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HortenseJ. Spillers Psychoanalysis and Race bed into their arms. The foreignness had already begun in the instant grasp of sexual and embodied division. But from that moment on, the imposition of homogeneity and sameness would also be understood as the great text of the "tradition" of "race." The Fanonian abyss requires this ur-text as the "answer" that fosters a two-way immobility. But before "race," something else has happened both within the context of"race" and alongside it. Does tradition, then depositories of discourse and ways of speaking, kinds of social practice and relations enable some questions and not others? This seems so, but tradition, which hides its own crevices and interstices, is offered as the suture that takes on all the features of smoothness; in order to present itself as transparent, unruffled surface, it absorbs the rejects according to its most prominent configurations. But it seems that the move toward self-reflexivity demands a test of inherited portions of cultural content in order to discover not only what tradition conceals but, as a result, what one, under its auspices, is forced to blindside. What difference did it make that Fanon was a native speaker of French? That he had earned a significant place in French intellectual circles? His response seems appropriate the sideways glance, the superbly ironical look. It was the effect of scission at the heart of the diasporic utterance. What he could not do, however, was read its outcome in reference to the "Negro of the Antilles," as well as to "Frantz Fanon." To have admitted that the diasporic African is cut on the bias to the West and not sharply at odds with it would have involved him in a contradiction that his polemic against the West could not abide. Nevertheless, the problematic that he carved out remains intact, and that is the extent to which the psychoanalytic hermeneutic has the least relevance to African diasporic lifeworlds.
Turning now to another protocol, we have the chance to pose the question again in an altered context. I want to look briefly at aspects of Marie-Cecile and Edmond Ortigues's Oedipe africain as an instance of psychoanalytic reference to a non-European community of subjects and as a systematic examination of symbolic currency (symbolization) as a response to the riddle that Fanon advances concerning the "Negro of the Antilles." Again, it is important to my mind to insist that even though diasporic African and continental African communities share "race," they pointedly differ in cultural ways and means; the contrary view, which flattens out black into the same thing despite time, weather, geography, and the entire range of complicating factors that go into the fashioning of persons, is difficult to put to rest, given, especially, what seems to be the unchanging face of racism. But unless we introduce cultural specificity to the picture, we run the risk of reenforcing the very myth that we would subvert. In that regard, the emphasis that Oedipe africain places on the processes of symbolization not only in the workings of psychoanalytic practice but in the making of human culture more broadly speaking offers a powerful antidote to reductive formulations. I have also examined While the authors acknowledge that the analyst must attempt to understand the patient in the entire context of his or her lifeworld and that no point of comparison can be sustained between one culture and another along a particular line of stress without an examination of the whole, they do contend that the oedipal complex pertains to all human societies. Its nuances will differ, however, according to one's standing in the social order and the strategies of acculturation that are available to subjects within a given natal community. The authors suggest here that "a practitioner at work in a society foreign to his own definitely illustrates an essential characteristic of the analytic attitude; that is to say, no proposition can be understood without reference to a familial, social, and cultural context."8 If the knowledge that the analyst has about the total context is not exhaustive, "then what counts above all else is the analytical attitude that seeks to understand the place of the subject in what he says."9 It seems to me that all dogmatic pronouncement, before and despite "what the subject says," is precisely the way in which traditional analyses, of various schools of thought, have failed, including all brands of nationalist thinking, as well as more informed opinions that have evolved a template of values to which "the black man" is supposed to conform, and including, moreover, "the black man" as a formulation itself. This whole vital soul, imagined to be snoring beneath the wisdom of the ages, conveniently poised for the exact liberatory moment, or "leader," is actually an unknown quantity in this very "soul" we thought we knew. Because the analyst, from the Ortigues's point of view, awaits a content, he has in effect no program to "sell." But the analyst here does not even do that much; he or she responds to a seeker.
Attempting to understand the subject in his or her discourse, the Ortigues address the specificity of illness by way of a number of case studies (references to aggression, the persecution complex and its intricate 8. "En decrivant dans ce chapitre la situation d'un psychanalyste travaillant dans une civilisation etrangere a la sienne, nous n'avons fait en definitive qu'illustrer un caractere essentiel de l'attitude analytique puisqu'aucun propos ne peut se comprendre sans reference au contexte familial, social, culturel" (OA, p. 57).
9. "Faudrait-il en conclure qu'une information sociologique poussee doit preceder le travail clinique? Nous repondrons que, si un minimum d'informations est necessaire, ce qui importe avant tout c'est l'attitude analytique qui cherche a comprendre la place du sujet dans ce qu'il dit" (OA, p. 57; emphasis added).
functions, and so on). But in each instance the doctors, in touch with patients who have sought them out or have been referred to them by parents or school administrators, are not treating a single individual alone but an ensemble. Even the latter is not limited to the familial nucleus but may include ancestral and religious figures; in some cases, these might be the rab an otherworldly figure and the marabout, both of whom are active cultural figures in the Wolof, Lebu, and Serer communities of Senegal. The unseen seen, the "evidence" of things not seen, the rab, who may be either perverse of conduct "or possessively loving regarding a subject," is often felt to be responsible for certain facets of the subject's behavior. In this cultural setting, "illness is not a clinical entity at all" and certainly not foremost, but is "attributed by subjects to magical causality or the intervention of the divine. aJrzque nozze. While the Ortigues are aware that their project comes freighted with its own peculiar cultural baggage and bias, they nevertheless take their chances within the framework of certain psychoanalytic assumptions, as we have seen. Sow, on the other hand, locates the subject at last within a global scheme of reading that examines the basic tenets of West African culture. As informative as this method may be, it is in its own way as general and generalist as he claims that the classical descriptions of mental illnesses are to the African field. Too "superficial and artificial" to account for "psychological, social, human, and clinical realities" en-10. "Et, en effet, ici, la maladie n'est pas une entite clinique. Pour les maladies mentales il n'y a de classification que par la causalite magique ou le destin voulu par Dieu.... On se refere soit a une action con trariante des rab, soit a 'l ' amour' possessif de rab lies a u ne famille, etc." (OA, p. 40).
11. "L'element de coherence dans la representation de la maladie c'est le rab.... C'est pourquoi nos consultants sont deroutes par nos interrogatoires" (OA, p. 40). countered in traditional African communities, the nosographical and nosological categories and tables, Sow argues, are themselves less objectionable to him than the inadequate supplement of their means with culture-specific strategies.l2 In Les Structures anthropologiques he attempts to go beneath the manifestations of Western practice to penetrate its leading premises, to address and correct the problem, except that, in doing so, his chief actors are the macroelements of narrative and belief the thematics of myth, of ancient tale and report. In that regard, he paints with a broader brush, as it were, and covers a canvass of wider scope, but ironically it seems that we lose the import of the psychoanalytic in the process precisely because, to Sow, it is unimpressively grounded in the messiness of the everyday world, in the utter evasion of the neat and rational category.
For example, madness in Sow's critique is similarly configured to the way it is sketched in Oedipe africain as a mishap in an ensemble of sociocultural relations. Sow calls it a "'sign"' that indicates straightaway that the subject is expressing conflict between himself and the constitutive authorities of his personality that are external to him (SA, p. 42; AS, p. 44). Sow consistently distinguishes between personnalite and personne.l3 It is the role of traditional therapy, then, alongside the interactive participation of family and community, to read and interpret the sign, to determine at what point in the constitutive network of the intimate structure of personality there has been breakdown or rupture in an otherwise highly articulated social function (see SA, p. 42; AS, p. 44). While it is fairly clear that Sow's "exterieures" look and behave suspiciously like the Lacanian "supports" through which the subject of enunciation is "spoken," Sow appears to so disjoin particular acts of enunciation from the culturally permissible that the neurosis itself erupts in "oneness." The double dose of narcissistic desire, therefore, follows from "individuality," when the neurotic personne behaves as if he were an end within himself:
In effect, what is signified for the neurotic is buried in his individuality and, in the final analysis, "doubles" or duplicates his narcissistic desire, which functions as if he were his own end in himself. But the real question for me in light of this formulation is, What is the relationship between Word and the word in which personne, neurotic and otherwise, is orchestrated? It appears that we pass here rather too quickly dropping the ball is more like it from a social dysfunction to a coerced repair in the formidable evocation of overwhelming devices, the great di ex machina that silence all before them the Law, the Origin, the Tradition. "Man confronting the sacred" is a mighty idea, but who can stand before it? And isn't it quite possible that such standing would be unique? would represent an inimitable moment or an originary and irrecoverable act?
Nevertheless, Sow's insistence on a constitutive network restores the psychoanalytic hermeneutic to its social coherence, to its intersubjective function. As traditional therapy in his account seeks to transform mental illness into an articulated language, it would repair the broken link in which the individual is not alone located: "Reestablishing order in the subject reconstitutes the loose connection and reinserts the subject into the place from which he has been expelled, cut off from his source of nourishment by an 'aggressor"' (AS, p. 44).15
An "affliction" in the structure of communication implies an aversive meeting of paroles, and, to that extent, the anthropological elements of madness in African society do not deny, at the very least, conflict at the heart of human relations. Sow's "answer," however, by deferring or displacing the source of illness onto a global abstracted Outer, envisages an absolute otherness, whereas the struggle for meaning appears to "reduce" the absolute by dispersing its centrality. In other words, the subject, in a different order of things, must discover the degree to which he has engendered his own alienation. Consequently, the Western subject, it seems, sprouts guilt and big shoulders in taking on responsibility for an outcome, whereas his African counterpart, at least if Sow is right, does not acquire a discourse for the guilty conscience inasmuch as his ultimate ground of social and moral reference is situated "outside" himself.
14.
En effet, on pour rai t dire que le si gnifie du nevrose es t e nfou i dans son individualite et, au bout du compte, "double" son desir narcissique qui fonctionne comme s'il etait, en lui-meme, sa propre finalite; alors que le signifie de l'homme face au sacre, c'est le Verbe, la Loi, la Tradition, en un mot: l'Origine, dans le sacrifice de l'Ancetre fondateur, creatur de la Loi, garant de la paix et de la coexistence entre les humains actuels. In a sense, the universe projected in Les Structures anthropologiques is vestibular to both the historical and posthistorical insofar as it is finished and elegantly arranged according to an immemorial Law and Order that Sow elaborates at length. We can do no more than sketch some of its prominent features here. In West African cosmography, human and social order is based on an imbricated, yet hierarchical, grid of functions marked according to three levels of stress: (1) the sensible, given world of the microcosmos the world that is immediate and given, the world of the social; (2) "the intermediary world of the genies, the spirits, and a repertoire of malevolent and beneficent forces of the mesocosmos"; and (3) "the suprasensible world of the Spirits elect, the Ancestors, the Godhead" (SA, p. 45; AS, p. 48). But there are ancestors and the Ancestor(s), as it seems apparent that the capitalized Ancetre is the equivalent of the Godhead, if not exactly synonymous to it. Given this elaborate schematization, there is, in effect, "no one" in a rather different sense from the nothing and no one of Western philosophicaVpsychoanalytic discoursewith its eye trained, finally, on an eclipsed God, or the One about whom silence is in order. In African discursive and social practice, as Sow narrates the scene, one is nothing more nor less than a link through which the three great valences of order reverberate. Therapy thus consists in bringing one back to harmonious relations with a cosmogonic principle whose intent can be teased out in various mythic narratives. There, "the prescriptions, rules, interdictions, and models of conduct" aim toward a definitive suggestion: that "cultural order and coherence repose on a delicate, subtle balance of the differentiated identity of each and all" (SA, p. 154; AS, p. 159), primarily the continuity of the generations in the passage of the biological age group, wave on wave of horizontal confraternities in progression toward the status of ancestry. In such a system, the strategies of rapprochement between God and human appear in language "in speech, prayer, and dream, as the dialogue between distant interlocutors must pass through the privileged intercessory office of the Ancestors" (AS, p. 210 n. 9).16
From this perspective, mental illness is read as the interrupted circuitry between carefully delineated parts (see SA, pp. 10-11; AS, p. 6). But the texts of role and agency are not discoverable, inasmuch as they are already known from a transmitted structure of articulated cause and effect. Moreover, this symbolic economy, which rests in a transcendent signifier, generates a Story, unlike the discourse that breaks up into the atomized particles of evasive meaning, or a meaning delayed in the "effects" of the signifier. We would regard the latter as a symptom of modern social analysis that follows the trails of fragmented social objects in short, a world defined by the loss of hierarchy, privileged moments, and ineluctably declarative ambiguity expelled utterances. We know this world as our own the scene of scission and displacement.
But where would this buzz of the harmonious leave the culturally "illiterate," the one who misreads the traffic signals? In the opening chapter of Les Structures anthropologiques, Sow treats at length the occurrence and frequency of mental illness in West African communities. As he adopts nosographical categories of description familiar to Western psychiatric practice, he is convinced that the categories themselves are illequipped to treat key questions, such as "the problem of the stain, of the pure and impure, that dominates Swedish psychopathology, for instance" (SA, p. 31 n. 36; AS, p. 32 n. 10), or the phenomenon of"la bouffee psychotique": the most characteristictormal aspect of African psychiatry (SA, p. 31; AS, p. 31). If the "bouffee psychotique" is a characteristic form in African medicine, then persecution is the most frequently and meaningfully recurrent thematic of Continental practice (see SA, p. 34; AS, p. 35). He claims that it not only colors the entire field of practice but that it also occupies a privileged place in the anthropological system of representations across Black Africa. The ensemble of premises against which Sow leads up to his reading of the African conception of cosmos and its signifying role in the mental theatre might be summarized according to two binarily opposed tables of value. Traditional African institutions, in their preventive or prophylactic capacity, effectively maintain personal, interpersonal, and communal equilibrium. The psychological defenses are cultural and collective and may be compared with what we spoke of earlier as the Western implantation or interiorization of guilt.l7 In other words, the persecutor in African culture embodies the externalization of guilt, whereas in Western culture, the guilt function is assumed by the person. Sow evaluates the internalizing of guilt as (1) "the origin of the morbid structure" and (2) "the sociocultural context of sin and blame" (SA, p. 25 n. 20; AS, p. 24 n. 7). But is it possible that the binary disposition is less than dispositive, even in a traditional African setting? Is it possible that traditional structures, precisely because they are time honored, do not always respond to a particular demand?
Among the case studies presented in Oedipe africain, the Ortigues's Samba C., a fourteen-year-old Wolof Muslim, might raise interesting problems for Sow's scheme. "According to the psychotherapeutic material presented to them," the authors believe that Samba did reach the internalization of conflict, which process Sow identifies as the origin of morbidity in Western disorders, and that a dream reported to them by the Samba's parents reported that the outbreak persisted for several months, and he was eventually led to neurological consultation and hospitalized. All the tests administered to him proved negative. During hospitalization, Samba's state was unchanged three weeks later; he left the hospital after insisting upon it, having attempted escapes daily. Shortly thereafter, he was hospitalized in the psychiatric unit. In the course of a year, he was hospitalized three times and during interim periods was treated as an outpatient, subjected, during each term of hospitalization, to a series of electroshocks at the same time as psychotherapy. A neuroleptic treatment was pursued as well. 
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Psychoanalysis and Race what is, for all intents and purposes, a question of their own: "Did not Samba's culture impose on him, or propose to him in a privileged way the solution to his hallucinatory psychosis, vis-a-vis the theme of persecution?"22 The doctors believed that Samba had "jumped" my word his circumstance by internalizing his dilemma, by seeking to resolve it at the level of personality. In a sense, cutting loose from certain communal beliefs, feeling himself driven to the wall, he had sought other means of address and "become a stranger to himself while doing so, acceding to the level of personal conscience that had situated him 'well ahead of the fathers."'23 In the culture in question, one did not reach for advancement beyond or away from the group, as they read the picture. At best, Samba's condition in the end "appeared fragile, as the 'devil' remained discretely present" (OA, p. 100).
What I have interpreted in the foregoing paragraphs as declarative assertions are advanced as inquiries in the text, and this is important to note, inasmuch as the doctors are themselves aware that their speculative instruments are adopted from a very different cultural framework. For instance, they question whether or not it is thinkable that Samba has arrived at the interiorization of the conflict that he clearly expressed and whose implications he could explain "Est-il pensable qu'il parvienne a interioriser sa culpabilite?" (OA, p. 99). Furthermore, they handle certain conclusions that they have tentatively reached in a subjunctive appeal: In effect, Samba's assumption of guilt would suppose that he had disconnected himself from certain communal values, and is such delinking not only possible but even desirable? The Ortigues go on to say that everything during the course of initial treatment happened "as if" Samba, feeling no way out, had placed all his hope, had articulated all his demand in the opening dialogue of the first interviews and as if"he assumed the risk of an unknown outcome" ("il assumait le risque de l'issue inconnue") (OA, p. 100). His parents, "feeling anxious, powerless, and overwhelmed by Samba's auto-aggressive conduct," following the failure of traditional treatment, "sought to turn him over to 'the doctors' and also accepted the risks." During the course of the doctors' treatment, Samba's family consulted "un marabout 'plus fort' que les precedents," since the doctors 22. "Mais cela ne peut empecher de se demander si la culture qui est celle de Samba ne lui impose pas ou ne lui propose pas de maniere privilegiee la solution de la psychose hallucinatoire a theme de persecution" (OA, p. 100).
23. As readers going back and forth on this, grappling in another language, about a vastly different culture, not Western, French, English, or diasporic for that matter, trying to see through other eyes to the truth of the matter or even gain some clarity concerning it, we are confronted with mutually exclusive questions. Perhaps all the doctors and theorists are right, or more precisely, know how to be, within the particular parameters of insight and blindness that frame their discourse. But the affecting line "tout son espoir, toute sa demande" (OA, p. 100) sketches a face before us whose details are unreadable, except that we hear in its trace of the paraphrase the stunning bafflement of one at pains to know why he suffers, and it seems that we are captivated there in the inscription of particular address. There is the society, doubtlessly so, but what about Samba? Another way to ask this question is the impossible, What does he say he wants? Unless I have misunderstood the matter, the "hermeneutic demand" of the psychoanalytic itinerary unfolds from each of the Sambas' articulated wannas-be, but in what world? Is it thinkable that a Samba was raising, in the depths of his being, a question that his culture could not answer, even though the latter had opened the place of the question by giving it its props, its materiality? Is the quest conditioned by the epistemic choices available to the want-to-be of the subject? And if the subject "overreaches" the given discursive conditions, does madness attend, no one quite knowing what he is saying, as indeed was reported to have happened at the onset of Samba's psychotic course? For the Ortigues, Samba's dilemma raises the question of recognition by the brothers, which they contend is routed through "Oedipe africain." It is at heart an inquiry concerning status and the variable positions through which it is expressed. In Samba's society, "the search for status recognition by the 'brothers' is a dominant mode of manhood affirmation" ("la recherche d'une reconnaissance de mon statut par les 'freres' est un mode dominant de l'affirmation virile" [OA, p. 135]). As we observed before, the brothers are the progressive, or processual, confraternity of age-mates precisely linked by the time of birth. "The wish to be a man expresses itself here in a form and content different from the ones that we know in European societies," say the Ortigues. "In Europe, young Oedipus wishes to be a rival in tasks, actions, and realizations; it is a rivalry that is manifest by objective sanction," or we could say that the objectifiable nature of goals acts to mediate the rivalry making a better boat, for instance, or hurling a discus farther than another. In brief, it seems that the socius of the objectifiable aim may be called competitive. In the Senegalese field, rivalry After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world, a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only niors "for real or imagined crimes," as the young "were transformed into goods for the slave trade.''3l The slave trade, of course, bears none of the advantages of myth, but shows some of its earmarks, as the Atlantic trade might be thought of as one of the founding events of modern history and economy. But for our purposes here, the execrable trade, in radically altering the social system in Old and New World "domestic community," is as violent and disruptive as the never-did-happenstance of mythic and oneiric inevitability. In other words, this historical event, like a myth, marks so rigorous a transition in the order of things that it launches a new way of gauging time and human origin: It underwrites, in short, a new genealogy defined by a break with Tradition with the Law of the Ancestors and the paternal intermediary.
I1 est en effet bien difficile d'imaginer
From my perspective, then, African Oedipus is the term that mediates a new symbolic order. It allows us to see that "father" designates a function rather than, as Meillassoux points out, a "genitor": the father is "he who nourishes and protects you, and who claims your produce and labor in return."32 In that regard, the African Oedipus removes the element of sentimentality from the myth and exposes it as a structure of relations instead. The riddle of origin that the Oedipus is supposed to constitute, first, as a crisis, then as a resolution of order and degree, was essentially cancelled by the Atlantic trade, as the "crisis," for all intents and purposes, has continued on the other side, the vantage from which I am writing. In the essay from which this writing is excerpted, I spoke about a subject in discourse, crossed by stigmata, as the psychoanalytic difference that has yet to be articulated. In the longer essay, I define the stigmatized subject as one whose access to discourse must be established as a human right and not assumed. I am referring specifically here to the history of slavery in the Americas and not only its traditions and practices of"chattel property," but, related to it, the strictures against literacy imposed on the bonded. Inasmuch as classical psychoanalytic practice works to transform symptomaticity into a narrative, I take it that discourse constitutes its primary value. The raced subject in an American context must, therefore, work his way through a layered imperative and impediment, which deeply implicates History in any autobiographical itinerary. I think that I am prepared to say that those markings on the social body of New World Africanity are the stripes of an oedipal crisis (for male and female children) that can only be cleared away now by a "confrontation" with the "scene" of its occurrence, but as if in myth. In other words, the discontinuity that the abandoned son demarcates here must be carried out as a 
